The Economic Consequences of Legislative Oversight: Theory and Evidencefrom the Medical Profession / Shawn Everett Kantor, Patrick Legros.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kantor, Shawn Everett.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Legros, Patrick.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4281.

NBER working paper series no. w4281

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Medical laws and legislation.

Physicians--Licenses.

Physicians.

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

The Economic Consequences of Legislative Oversight

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1993.

Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

Summary:

This paper provides a positive analysis of how formal, periodic legislative oversight of regulatory agencies can influence market outcomes and the welfare of regulated industries. Whereas previous research has focused on the political distinction between passive and active legislative oversight, this paper shows that there exists an important economic difference between two mechanisms as well. We develop a principal-agent model that describes how a regulatory agent's incentives are influenced if its actions are publicly scrutinized. Our empirical analysis supports our claim that formal oversight leads to measurable economic effects.

Notes:

Print version record

February 1993.