Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? / Daniel P. Kessler, Mark McClellan.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kessler, Daniel P.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

McClellan, Mark.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w5466.

NBER working paper series no. w5466

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1996.

Summary:

`Defensive medicine' is a potentially serious social problem: if fear of liability drives health care providers to administer treatments that do not have worthwhile medical benefits, then the current liability system may generate inefficiencies many times greater than the costs of compensating malpractice claimants. To obtain direct empirical evidence on this question, we analyze the effects of malpractice liability reforms using data on all elderly Medicare beneficiaries treated for serious heart disease in 1984, 1987, and 1990. We find that malpractice reforms that directly reduce provider liability pressure lead to reductions of 5 to 9 percent in medical expenditures without substantial effects on mortality or medical complications. We conclude that liability reforms can reduce defensive medical practices.

Notes:

Print version record

February 1996.