Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing Drives / Richard B. Freeman, Morris M. Kleiner.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Freeman, Richard B.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kleiner, Morris M.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w2805.

NBER working paper series no. w2805

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Industrial relations.

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1988.

Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.

Summary:

The direct role of employers in union organizing has long been a neglected part of the union organizing literature. In this study we examine the determinants and consequences of employer behavior when faced with an organizing drive. Our principal substantive findings are: - that there is a substitution between high wages/benefits/good work conditions/supervisory practices and "tough" management opposition to unionism. - that a high innate propensity for a union victory deters management opposition, while some indicators of a low propensity also reduce opposition. - that "positive industrial relations" raise the chances the firm will defeat the union in an election, as does bringing in consultants and having supervisors campaign intensely against the union. - that the careers of managers whose wages/supervisory practices/ benefits lead to union organizing drives, much less to union victories, suffer as a result. In general we interpret our results as consistent with the notion that firms behave in a profit maximizing manner in opposing an organizing drive and with the basic proposition that management opposition, reflected in diverse forms of behavior, is a key component in the on-going decline in private sector unionism in the United States.

Notes:

Print version record

December 1988.