Do Sentencing Guidelines Raise the Cost of Punishment? / Jose Meade, Joel Waldfogel.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Meade, Jose.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Waldfogel, Joel.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w6361.

NBER working paper series no. w6361

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1998.

Summary:

When judges have discretion over fines and prison terms, sentencing exhibits a tendency" toward efficiency: fines are larger, and prison terms shorter, for offenders with greater ability to" pay. Sentencing guidelines place fairly rigid upper and lower limits on fines and prison terms" and may inhibit the achievement of efficiency in sentencing. Preventing judges from substituting" fines for prison terms may raise the cost of imposing punishment. The objective of this paper is" to measure the efficiency cost of sentencing guidelines using data on federal offenders sentenced" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We find evidence that the guidelines raise the cost of" punishment by nearly 5 percent of the total imprisonment cost of federal offenders. Not" surprisingly, constraints on cost minimization raise costs.

Notes:

Print version record

January 1998.