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Signaling and Accounting Information / Stewart C. Myers.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Myers, Stewart C.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w3193.
NBER working paper series no. w3193
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1989.
Summary:
This paper develops a signaling model in which accounting information improves real investment decisions. Pure cash flow reporting is shown to lead to underinvestment when managers have superior information but are acting in shareholders' interests. Accounting by prespecified, "objective" rules alleviates the underinvestment problem.
Notes:
Print version record
December 1989.

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