Product Market Competition, Union Organizing Activity, and Employer Resistence / John M. Abowd, Henry S. Farber.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Abowd, John M.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Farber, Henry S.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w3353.

NBER working paper series no. w3353

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1990.

Summary:

We develop and estimate a model of the union's optimal extent of

organizing activity that accounts for the decision of employers regarding

resistance to union organizing. The central exogenous variable in the

analysis is the quantity of quasi-rents per worker available to be split

between unions and employers.

We measure available quasi-rents per worker as the difference per

worker between total industry revenues net of raw materials costs and labor

costs evaluated at the opportunity cost of the workers. Using two-digit

industry level data for thirty-five U.S. industries for the period 1955

through 1986, we find that both organizing activity and employer resistance

to unionization are positively related to available quasi-rents per worker.

However, there is still a strong negative trend in union organizing activity

and a strong positive trend in employer resistance after controlling for

quasi-rents per worker. Thus, the explanation for the decline in union

organizing activity and the increase in employer resistance to unionization

since the mid 1970's lies elsewhere.

Notes:

Print version record

May 1990.