'You Will: ' A Macroeconomic Analysis of Digital Advertising / Jeremy Greenwood, Yueyuan Ma, Mehmet Yorukoglu.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Greenwood, Jeremy.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Ma, Yueyuan.

Yorukoglu, Mehmet.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28537.

NBER working paper series no. w28537

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.

Summary:

An information-based model is developed where traditional and digital advertising finance the provision of free media goods and affect price competition. Digital advertising is directed toward consumers while traditional advertising is undirected. The equilibrium is suboptimal. Media goods are under provided with both types of advertising. Additionally, traditional advertising is excessive because it is undirected. The tax-cum-subsidy policy that overcomes these inefficiencies is characterized. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. Digital advertising increases welfare significantly and is disproportionately financed by better-off consumers. The welfare gain from the optimal policy is much smaller than the gain from digital advertising.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2021.