Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders / Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas, Raffaele Saggio, Stephen A. Woodbury.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Lachowska, Marta.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Mas, Alexandre.

Saggio, Raffaele.

Woodbury, Stephen A.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28409.

NBER working paper series no. w28409

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.

Summary:

We employ a revealed-preference test to distinguish between wage posting and wage bargaining in the labor market. Using a sample of dual jobholders in Washington State, we estimate the sensitivity of wages and separation rates to wage shocks in a secondary job. In lower parts of the wage distribution, improvements in the outside option lead to higher separations rates but not to higher wages, consistent with wage posting. In the highest wage quartile, improved outside options translate to higher wages, but not higher separation rates, consistent with bargaining. In the aggregate, bargaining appears to be a limited determinant of wage setting.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2021.