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Vertical Integration and Production Inefficiency in the Presence of a Gross Receipts Tax / Benjamin Hansen, Keaton S. Miller, Caroline Weber.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Hansen, Benjamin.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Miller, Keaton S.
Weber, Caroline.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28478.
NBER working paper series no. w28478
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.
Summary:
We quantify the effects of a gross receipts tax (GRT) on vertical integration for the first time. We use data from the Washington state recreational cannabis industry, which has numerous advantages including a clean natural experiment: a 25% GRT imposed on cannabis firms was subsequently replaced by an excise tax at retail. We find the short-run elasticity of vertical integration with respect to the intermediate good net- of-tax rate is -0.15 and the long-run elasticity is more than twice as large. We find these incentives lead to large output losses - production increases by 23 percent when the GRT is eliminated.
Notes:
Print version record
February 2021.

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