Should We Have Automatic Triggers for Unemployment Benefit Duration And How Costly Would They Be? / Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Peter Ganong, Jonathan Gruber.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Ganong, Peter.

Gruber, Jonathan.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w29703.

NBER working paper series no. w29703

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.

Summary:

We model automatic trigger policies for unemployment insurance by simulating a weekly panel of individual labor market histories, grouped by state. We reach three conclusions: (i) policies designed to trigger immediately at the onset of a recession result in benefit extensions that occur in less sick labor markets than the historical average for benefit extensions; (ii) the ad hoc extensions in the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions in total cover a similar number of additional weeks as common proposals for automatic triggers, but concentrate coverage more in weaker labor markets; (iii) compared to ex post policy, the cost of common proposals for automatic triggers is close to zero.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2022.