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Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension / Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Louis Kaplow.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4079.
- NBER working paper series no. w4079
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1992.
- Summary:
- This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension. When individuals are perfectly informed, optimal sanctions are maximal because, as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, society can economize on enforcement resources by reducing the probability of apprehension while increasing sanctions. But when individuals imperfectly observe the probability of apprehension, it may be optimal to apply lower sanctions while expending more enforcement resources.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- May 1992.
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