Merit Pay for School Superintendents? / Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard P. Chaykowski, Randy A. Ehrenberg.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ehrenberg, Ronald G.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Chaykowski, Richard P.

Ehrenberg, Randy A.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w1954.

NBER working paper series no. w1954

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1986.

Summary:

Given the important role that school district administrators

play in the educational process, one might expect their

"performance" to be of fundamental importance in determining both

how much students learn and the cost of public education to

taxpayers. Yet, while public debate has considered the issue of

merit pay plans for teachers, virtually no attention has been

directed to the methods by which school administrators are

compensated.

This paper provides evidence on whether school superintendents

are explicitly or implicitly rewarded for their

"performance" by higher compensation and/or greater opportunities

for mobility. We analyze panel data from over 700 school

'districts in New Ycrk State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period.

Measures of performance are defined and then entered into salary

level, salary change, and mobility equations. While evidence is

provided that school superintendents are rewarded for

"performance", the magnitude of the rewards appear to be quite

small.

Notes:

Print version record

June 1986.