1 option
Efficient Competition With Small Numbers -- With Applications to Privatisation and Mergers / Kala Krishna, Torben Tranaes.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Krishna, Kala.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w6952.
- NBER working paper series no. w6952
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1999.
- Summary:
- This paper studies competition between a small number of suppliers and a single buyer (or an auction with a small number of bidders and a single seller), when total demand (supply) is uncertain. It is well known that when a small number of suppliers compete in supply functions the service is not provided efficiently. We show that production efficiency is obtained if suppliers compete in simple two-part bid functions. However, profits are not eliminated. Moreover, the buyers' (sellers') decision regarding how much to buy is not efficient. We also show that suppliers (bidders in an auction) always have an incentive to merge (form bidding rings) in this setting.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- February 1999.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.