Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement / Maria Paula Gerardino, Stephan Litschig, Dina Pomeranz.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gerardino, Maria Paula.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Litschig, Stephan.

Pomeranz, Dina.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w23978.

NBER working paper series no. w23978

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2017.

Summary:

Public sector audits are a key element of state capacity. However, we find that they can create unintended distortions. Regression discontinuity analysis from Chile shows that audits lowered the use of auctions for public procurement, reduced supplier competition, and increased the likelihood of incumbent, small, and local firms winning contracts. Looking inside the black box of the audit process reveals that relative to comparable direct contracts, auctions underwent more than twice as many checks and led to twice as many detected infractions. Procurement officers perceive the consequences of such detected infractions as severe. These findings show that standard audit protocols can mechanically discourage the use of more regulated, complex and transparent procedures that involve more auditable steps.

Notes:

Print version record

October 2017.