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Allocating Scarce Information / Richard T. Holden, Anup Malani, Chris Teh.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Holden, Richard T.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w29846.
- NBER working paper series no. w29846
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.
- Summary:
- Sender conveys scarce information to a number of receivers to maximize the sum of receiver payoffs. Each receiver's payoff depends on the state of the world and an action she takes. The optimal action is state contingent. Under mild regularity conditions, we show that the payoff of each receiver is convex in the amount of information she receives. Thus, it is optimal for Sender to target information to a single receiver. We then study four extensions in which interior information allocations are optimal.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- March 2022.
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