Protecting Losers: Optimal Diversification, Insurance, and Trade Policy / S. Lael Brainard.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Brainard, S. Lael.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w3773.

NBER working paper series no. w3773

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Protecting Losers

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.

Summary:

This paper derives a portfolio diversification rationale for a trade policy regime that insures returns to nondiversifiable human capital investment. In the absence of complete insurance markets for human capital, the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by excessive specialization. The socially optimal investment portfolio entails diversification for the reasons familiar from the CAPM. By credibly promising to protect losers ex post, the government can achieve the optimally diversified investment pattern. In contrast to previous results, two instruments are sufficient to achieve both efficient reallocation and full insurance when human capital is mobile at some cost, due to the endogeneity of the initial investment decision.

Notes:

Print version record

July 1991.