1 option
Effciency and Equality in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance / Andrew Atkeson, Robert E. Lucas, Jr..
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Atkeson, Andrew.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4381.
- NBER working paper series no. w4381
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Unemployment insurance.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1993.
- Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.
- Summary:
- This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward, and show, with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper thus provides a simple prototype model suited to the study of the normative question: what is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency in resource allocation?
- Notes:
- Print version record
- June 1993.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.