Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory / Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Frédéric Malherbe.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bouton, Laurent.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol.

Malherbe, Frédéric.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21943.

NBER working paper series no. w21943

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.

Summary:

We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2016.