1 option
Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets? / Victoria R. Marone, Adrienne Sabety.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Marone, Victoria R.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28779.
- NBER working paper series no. w28779
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.
- Summary:
- We study the welfare effects of offering choice over coverage levels--"vertical choice"--in regulated health insurance markets. We emphasize that heterogeneity in the efficient level of coverage is not sufficient to motivate choice. When premiums do not reflect individuals' costs, it may not be in consumers' best interest to select their efficient coverage level. We show that vertical choice is efficient only if consumers with higher willingness to pay for insurance have a higher efficient level of coverage. We investigate this condition empirically and find that as long as a minimum coverage level can be enforced, the welfare gains from vertical choice are either zero or economically small.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- May 2021.
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