Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA / Pietro Tebaldi.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Tebaldi, Pietro.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w29869.

NBER working paper series no. w29869

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.

Summary:

In government-sponsored health insurance, subsidy design affects market outcomes. First, holding premiums fixed, subsidies determine insurance uptake and average cost. Insurers then respond to these changes, adjusting premiums. Combining data from the first four years of the California ACA marketplace with a model of insurance demand, cost, and insurers' competition, I quantify the impact of alternative subsidy designs on premiums, enrollment, costs, public spending, and consumer surplus. Younger individuals are more price sensitive and cheaper to cover. Increasing subsidies to this group would make all buyers better off, increase market participation, and lower average costs and average subsidies.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2022.