On the Welfare Gains from Tradeable Benefits-in-Kind / Martin Ravallion.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ravallion, Martin.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28728.

NBER working paper series no. w28728

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.

Summary:

Governments often prohibit resale of the benefits-in-kind provided by antipoverty programs. Yet the personal gains from those benefits are likely to vary and to be known privately, so there can be gains to poor people from trading their assignments. We know very little about those gains. To help address this knowledge gap, the paper models a competitive market for assignments, and simulates the market using an unusual survey of workers on a rural public-works scheme in a poor state of India. The results indicate large gains from tradeable assignments after first randomizing. The gains exceed those from poverty targeting without trade and are not lower for poorer households or female workers. Fully realizing the gains from trade in practice may require complementary policies to help people access the market and to support its administration and regulation.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2021.