Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools / Jesse M. Bruhn, Scott A. Imberman, Marcus A. Winters.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bruhn, Jesse M.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Imberman, Scott A.

Winters, Marcus A.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w27607.

NBER working paper series no. w27607

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.

Summary:

We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers.

Notes:

Print version record

July 2020.