My Account Log in

1 option

An Economic Model of the Planning Fallacy / Markus K. Brunnermeier, Filippos Papakonstantinou, Jonathan A. Parker.

NBER Working papers Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Brunnermeier, Markus K.
Contributor:
Papakonstantinou, Filippos.
Parker, Jonathan A.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14228.
NBER working paper series no. w14228
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008.
Summary:
People tend to underestimate the work involved in completing tasks and consequently finish tasks later than expected or do an inordinate amount of work right before projects are due. We present a theory in which people underpredict and procrastinate because the ex-ante utility benefits of anticipating that a task will be easy to complete outweigh the average ex-post costs of poor planning. We show that, given a commitment device, people self-impose deadlines that are binding but require less smoothing of work than those chosen by a person with objective beliefs. We test our theory using extant experimental evidence on differences in expectations and behavior. We find that reported beliefs and behavior generally respond as our theory predicts. For example, monetary incentives for accurate prediction ameliorate the planning fallacy while incentives for rapid completion aggravate it.
Notes:
August 2008.
Print version record

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

Find

Home Release notes

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Find catalog Using Articles+ Using your account