The Cost of Curbing Externalities with Market Power: Alcohol Regulations and Tax Alternatives / Christopher Conlon, Nirupama L. Rao.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Conlon, Christopher.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Rao, Nirupama L.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30896.

NBER working paper series no. w30896

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.

Summary:

Products with negative externalities are often subject to regulations that limit competition. The single-product case may suggest that it is irrelevant for aggregate welfare whether output is restricted via corrective taxes or limiting competition. However, when products are differentiated curbing consumption through market power can be costly. Firms with market power may not only reduce total quantity, but distort the purchase decisions of inframarginal consumers. We examine a common regulation known as post-and-hold (PH) used by a dozen states for the sale of alcoholic beverages. Theoretically, PH eliminates competitive incentives among wholesalers selling identical products. We assemble unique data on distilled spirits from Connecticut, including matched manufacturer and wholesaler prices, to evaluate the welfare consequences of PH. For similar levels of ethanol consumption, PH leads to substantially lower consumer welfare (and government revenue) compared to excise, sales or Ramsey taxes by distorting consumption choices away from high-quality/premium brands and towards low-quality brands. Replacing PH with volumetric or ethanol-based taxes could reduce consumption by over 9% without reducing consumer surplus, and increase tax revenues by over 300%.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2023.