Inattention and Inequity in School Matching / Stefan F. Bucher, Andrew Caplin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bucher, Stefan F.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Caplin, Andrew.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w29586.

NBER working paper series no. w29586

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.

Summary:

The attractive properties of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm rest on the assumption of perfect information. Yet field studies of school matching show that information is imperfect, particularly for disadvantaged students. We model costly strategic learning when schools are ex ante symmetric, agree on their ranking of students, and learning is rationally inattentive. Our analytic solution quantifies how each student's rank, learning costs and prior beliefs interact to determine their gross and net welfare as well as the extent and form of mistakes they make. In line with the evidence, we find that lower-ranked students are affected disproportionately more by information costs, generally suffering a larger welfare loss than higher-ranked students. Interactions between mechanism design, inattention and inequity are thus of first order importance.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2021.