1 option
Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism? / Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Simeon Nichter.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Bobonis, Gustavo J.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w31266.
- NBER working paper series no. w31266
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.
- Summary:
- Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens' demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. With regards to mechanisms, audits undermine clientelist relationships by reducing citizens' interactions with politicians and their knowledge of incumbents. Furthermore, audits significantly deteriorate citizens' perceptions of politician reciprocity in a hypothetical trust game. Results also offer novel insights into audits' dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- May 2023.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.