Property Rights in Historical Political Economy: When do Wedges Wither? / Lee J. Alston, Bernardo Mueller.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Alston, Lee J.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Mueller, Bernardo.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w29991.

NBER working paper series no. w29991

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.

Summary:

Countries are not equally developed in large part because most countries face sets of property rights that do not foster growth despite the aggregate gains that would result from changing property rights. The difference in rents to society between the extant set of property rights and some seemingly better alternative we define as a "Demsetz" wedge. We explore the forces that sustain the status quo as well the forces that prompt property rights to change.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2022.