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A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California / Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Daichi Shimamoto.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Kawai, Kei.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Nakabayashi, Jun.
Shimamoto, Daichi.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30271.
NBER working paper series no. w30271
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.
Summary:
We apply a Regression Discontinuity based approach to screen for collusion developed in Kawai et al. (2022) to public procurement data from five countries. We find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. Our results suggest that the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least about 5% for all E-procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions in Indonesia. We cannot reject the null of competition in other countries.
Notes:
Print version record
July 2022.

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