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Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-By-Doing and Strategic Buyers / Andrew Sweeting, Dun Jia, Shen Hui, Xinlu Yao.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Sweeting, Andrew.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28272.
- NBER working paper series no. w28272
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.
- Summary:
- We generalize recent models of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing for long-lived strategic buyers, with a single parameter capturing the extent to which each buyer internalizes future buyer surplus. Many of the equilibria that exist when buyers are atomistic or myopic are eliminated when buyers internalize even a modest share of their effects on future surplus. The equilibria that survive tend to be those where long-run market competition is preserved.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 2020.
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