How do Physicians Respond to Malpractice Allegations? Evidence from Florida Emergency Departments / Caitlin Carroll, David M. Cutler, Anupam Jena.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Carroll, Caitlin.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Cutler, David M.

Jena, Anupam.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28330.

NBER working paper series no. w28330

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.

Summary:

A substantial literature has studied the influence of malpractice pressure on physician behavior. However, these studies generally focus on malpractice pressure stemming from state laws that govern liability exposure, which may be unknown or not salient to physicians. We test how physicians respond to malpractice allegations made directly against them. Our sample is Emergency Department physicians in Florida, where we have the universe of data on patients and how they are treated along with a census of malpractice complaints. We find that physicians oversee 9% fewer discharges after malpractice allegations and treat each discharge 4% more expensively after an allegation. These effects are true for both allegations that result in money paid and allegations which are dropped. Further, the increase in treatment is generalized, i.e., not limited to patients with conditions similar to what the physician is reported for. The results suggest significant, if modest, impacts of malpractice claims on medical practice.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2021.