The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance / Marika Cabral, Can Cui, Michael Dworsky.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Cabral, Marika.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Cui, Can.

Dworsky, Michael.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26103.

NBER working paper series no. w26103

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2019.

Summary:

This paper analyzes the demand for insurance and the potential rationale for coverage mandates in the context of workers' compensation insurance. Workers' compensation is a state-regulated insurance program that provides employers with liability protection and employees with defined income and medical benefits in the event of work-related injuries or illnesses. Nearly all states have mandated workers' compensation insurance coverage; the sole exception is Texas. Using administrative data from the unique voluntary Texas workers' compensation insurance system, we estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance leveraging idiosyncratic regulatory updates to relative premiums across industry-occupation classifications. The difference-in-differences estimates indicate that the demand for workers' compensation coverage is price-sensitive, with a 1% increase in premiums leading to approximately a 0.3% decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and additional data on costs, we analyze potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage through subsidies or a mandate. This analysis suggests that some common market failure justifications for government intervention in insurance markets--adverse selection, market power, and externalities--may not be compelling justifications for a mandate in this setting.

Notes:

Print version record

July 2019.