The Weak State Trap / Leopoldo Fergusson, Carlos A. Molina, James A. Robinson.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Fergusson, Leopoldo.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Molina, Carlos A.

Robinson, James A.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w26848.

NBER working paper series no. w26848

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.

Summary:

Development outcomes come in 'clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to flourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the micro level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing influences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2020.