1 option
Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence / Sylvain Chassang, Lucia Del Carpio, Samuel Kapon.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Chassang, Sylvain.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28042.
- NBER working paper series no. w28042
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.
- Summary:
- We consider a government collecting taxes from a large number of tax-payers using limited enforcement capacity. Under random enforcement, limited capacity results in multiple equilibria: if most agents comply, limited enforcement is sufficient to dissuade individual misbehavior; if most agents do not comply, enforcement capacity is over-stretched and fails to dissuade misbehavior. In settings without behavioral frictions, prioritized enforcement strategies can implement high collection as the unique rationalizable outcome. We investigate both theoretically and experimentally the extent to which this insight extends to environments with incomplete information and bounded rationality.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- October 2020.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.