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Does the Invisible Hand Efficiently Guide Entry and Exit? Evidence from a Vegetable Market Experiment in India / Abhijit Banerjee, Greg Fischer, Dean Karlan, Matt Lowe, Benjamin N. Roth.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Banerjee, Abhijit.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Fischer, Greg.
Karlan, Dean.
Lowe, Matt.
Roth, Benjamin N.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30360.
NBER working paper series no. w30360
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.
Summary:
What accounts for the ubiquity of small vendors operating side-by-side in the urban centers of developing countries? Why don't competitive forces drive some vendors out of the market? We ran an experiment in Kolkata vegetable markets in which we induced (via subsidizing) some vendors to sell additional produce. The vendors earned higher profits, even when excluding the value of the subsidy. Nevertheless, after the subsidies ended vendors largely stopped selling the additional produce. Our results are consistent with collusion and inertial business practices suppressing competition and efficient market exit.
Notes:
Print version record
August 2022.

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