Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model / Ashley C. Craig, Joel Slemrod.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Craig, Ashley C.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Slemrod, Joel.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w30151.

NBER working paper series no. w30151

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.

Summary:

We provide a unified analysis of taxation and taxpayer education when individuals have an incomplete understanding of a complex tax system. The analysis is independent of whether income is earned legitimately, or by avoiding or evading taxes. In this sense, learning about tax minimization strategies (tax manipulation) is similar to learning about the tax code. The government in our model balances a trade-off: A better understanding of the tax system potentially allows taxpayers to optimize more effectively, but also affects government revenue. Optimal taxpayer education and the optimal amount of redistribution can both be characterized ex post by aggregate sufficient statistics that do not require information about how biases or behavioral responses vary across the decision margins.

Notes:

Print version record

June 2022.