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An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation / Joshua Schwartzstein, Andrei Shleifer.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Schwartzstein, Joshua.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14752.
- NBER working paper series no. w14752
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
- Summary:
- We propose an activity-generating theory of regulation. When courts make errors, tort litigation becomes unpredictable and as such imposes risk on firms, thereby discouraging entry, innovation, and other socially desirable activity. When social returns to innovation are higher than private returns, it may pay the society to generate some information ex ante about how risky firms are, and to impose safety standards based on that information. In some situations, compliance with such standards should entirely preempt tort liability; in others, it should merely reduce penalties. By reducing litigation risk, this type of regulation can raise welfare.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- February 2009.
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