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Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit / Amanda Y. Agan, Bo Cowgill, Laura K. Gee.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Agan, Amanda Y.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w29460.
- NBER working paper series no. w29460
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.
- Summary:
- We study how salary disclosures affect employer demand using a field experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters and over 2,000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary questions and the candidates' disclosures. Employers make negative inferences about non-disclosing candidates, and view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly-paid candidates) yield higher salary offers, but are negative signals of value (net of salary), yielding fewer callbacks. Male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other wage premiums (such as working at higher paying firms).
- Notes:
- Print version record
- November 2021.
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