Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt / Andres Gonzalez-Lira, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gonzalez-Lira, Andres.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28610.

NBER working paper series no. w28610

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.

Summary:

Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial, and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this campaign.

Notes:

Print version record

March 2021.