Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects / Paula Onuchic, Debraj Ray.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Onuchic, Paula.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Ray, Debraj.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28939.

NBER working paper series no. w28939

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.

Summary:

We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public's credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in non-fragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant "identities." We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.

Notes:

Print version record

June 2021.