Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising / Stephen Coate.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Coate, Stephen.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w8693.

NBER working paper series no. w8693

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001.

Summary:

This paper presents a model of political competition with campaign contributions and informative political advertising. Policy-motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like-minded candidates. Contributions are used to finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates' ideologies. The model embodies rational behavior on the part of all actors, is analytically tractable, and has a unique equilibrium. The paper uses the model to analyze the welfare economics of contribution limits. Such limits are shown to redistribute welfare from moderate voters to interest group members. They may or may not raise aggregate welfare.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2001.