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Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match / Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14864.
- NBER working paper series no. w14864
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Other Title:
- Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
- Summary:
- The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- April 2009.
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