Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance / Alain de Janvry, Frederico Finan, Elisabeth Sadoulet.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

de Janvry, Alain.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Finan, Frederico.

Sadoulet, Elisabeth.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w16635.

NBER working paper series no. w16635

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2010.

Summary:

This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2010.