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Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets / Robin S. Lee, Michael Schwarz.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Lee, Robin S.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w14922.
- NBER working paper series no. w14922
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
- Summary:
- We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion, and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap: i.e., if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- April 2009.
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