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Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information / Marcelo A. Fernandez, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Fernandez, Marcelo A.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w29043.
- NBER working paper series no. w29043
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2021.
- Summary:
- We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- July 2021.
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