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How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies? / Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, Guido Tabellini.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Persson, Torsten.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10176.
- NBER working paper series no. w10176
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2003.
- Summary:
- We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 2003.
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