Modern US Workers' Compensation and Work-Related Injury: No Evidence of Moral Hazard / Emiliano Huet-Vaughn, Youssef Benzarti.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Huet-Vaughn, Emiliano.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Benzarti, Youssef.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w28187.

NBER working paper series no. w28187

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2020.

Summary:

We exploit recent decades of US state-level reforms to the generosity of workers' compensation programs to estimate the associated moral hazard, utilizing an event- study design and analyzing 9 separate reform categories. The reforms vary - some affecting benefit size, some the probability of receiving benefits; some paid in cash, some in-kind; some constituting increases, some decreases, in generosity. Across the board, we find no evidence of resulting changes in workplace injuries, and, generally, can rule out even moderate moral hazard responses for severe and less severe injuries, suggesting a key moral hazard cost of workers' compensation benefits is negligible.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2020.