For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Risk-taking in New England, 1867-1880 / Peter Koudijs, Laura Salisbury, Gurpal Sran.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Koudijs, Peter.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Salisbury, Laura.

Sran, Gurpal.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w24998.

NBER working paper series no. w24998

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

For Richer, for Poorer

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.

Summary:

We study whether banks are riskier if managers have less liability. We focus on New England between 1867 and 1880 and consider the introduction of marital property laws that limited liability for newly wedded bankers. We find that banks with managers who married after a legal change had more leverage, were more likely to "evergreen" loans and violate lending rules, and lost more capital and deposits in the Long Depression of 1873-1878. This effect was most pronounced for bankers with wives from relatively wealthy families. We find no evidence that limiting liability increased firm investment at the county level.

Notes:

Print version record

September 2018.