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Can Health Insurance Competition Work? Evidence from Medicare Advantage / Vilsa Curto, Liran Einav, Jonathan Levin, Jay Bhattacharya.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Curto, Vilsa.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Einav, Liran.
Levin, Jonathan.
Bhattacharya, Jay.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w20818.
NBER working paper series no. w20818
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.
Summary:
We estimate the economic surplus created by Medicare Advantage under its reformed competitive bidding rules. We use data on the universe of Medicare beneficiaries, and develop a model of plan bidding that accounts for both market power and risk selection. We find that private plans have costs around 12% below fee-for-service costs, and generate around $50 dollars in surplus on average per enrollee-month, after accounting for the disutility due to enrollees having more limited choice of providers. Taxpayers provide a large additional subsidy, and insurers capture most of the private gains. We use the model to evaluate possible program changes.
Notes:
Print version record
December 2014.

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