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Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More? / Kala Krishna, Sergey Lychagin, Verónica Frisancho Robles.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Krishna, Kala.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lychagin, Sergey.
Frisancho Robles, Verónica.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21640.
NBER working paper series no. w21640
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Other Title:
Retaking in High Stakes Exams
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2015.
Summary:
Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's university placement exam. We find that limiting retaking, though individually harmful given the equilibrium, actually increases expected welfare across the board. This result comes from a general equilibrium effect: retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cutoffs.
Notes:
Print version record
October 2015.

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