Private Politics and Public Regulation / Georgy Egorov, Bård Harstad.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Egorov, Georgy.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Harstad, Bård.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19737.

NBER working paper series no. w19737

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013.

Summary:

We develop a dynamic game to explore the interaction between regulation and private policies, such as self-regulation by firms and activism. Without a public regulator, the possibility of self-regulation is bad for the firm, but good for activists who are willing to maintain a costly boycott to raise the likelihood of self-regulation. Results are reversed when the regulator is present: the firm then self-regulates to preempt public regulation, while activists start and continue boycotts to raise the likelihood of such regulation. Our analytical results describe when a boycott is likely, and when it may be expected to be short and/or successful. The model generates a rich set of testable comparative statics.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2013.